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Note 
AGENTS OF CHANGE: THE FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES OF FORWARDING MARKET 
PROFESSIONALS 
PETER D. ISAKOFF† 
They’re not afraid because other than Bernie Madoff, when was the 
last time someone on Wall Street faced any real 
punishment? . . . Sure, a few go to jail once in a while, but they’re 
usually out in a few months and then on the speaking circuit. That’s 
not exactly a deterrent against bad behavior that’s making you 
millions. 
  – Matt Taibbi1 
[I]nnovation creates challenges . . . .  
  It can foster incredibly complex financial products that fail to live 
up to buyers’ expectations, but generate fees for their creators and 
sellers. This complexity can bury important information needed for 
effective decision-making, so that even the most sophisticated are 
unable to make informed judgments about risk and payoff. Finally, 
it can mask old-fashioned manipulation and fraud. But whether 
innovation is used for good or ill, to improve the system or to 
manipulate it—it creates a challenge for regulators . . . to keep up 
with the industries they regulate. 
  – Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Mary 
Schapiro2 
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 1. David Sirota, To Deter Crime, Get Tough on Wall Street, IN THESE TIMES (Nov. 20, 
2010), http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/6683/to_deter_crime_get_tough_on_wall_street 
(quoting Matt Taibbi, author and journalist for Rolling Stone magazine) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 2. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Brodsky Family Lecture at 
Northwestern University School of Law (Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2010/spch110910mls.htm. 
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ABSTRACT 
  In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, the legal system struggles 
to effectively regulate forwarding market professionals—broker-
dealers and investment advisers who invest client funds with third 
parties. Defining the fiduciary duties these forwarding market 
professionals owe their clients when they invest funds with third 
parties raises complex issues concerning due diligence, postinvestment 
monitoring of investments, and disclosure of material facts. Weak 
regulatory standards, advances in technology in the financial-services 
industry, and changes in the scope of services provided by broker-
dealers emphasize both the inadequacies of the system created by the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934) Act and the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA) and the urgent need for a new regulatory 
standard. This Note contends that agency law provides a clear 
framework for defining the fiduciary duties that forwarding market 
professionals owe their clients for third-party investments. It then 
explains how the SEC is well situated to establish a fiduciary duty for 
forwarding market professionals based on agency principles under 
the Dodd-Frank Act. 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, Bernie Madoff operated a Ponzi scheme, 
manipulating almost $65 billion in financial investments to create a 
facade of profitability.3 Although Madoff engaged in blatantly 
criminal activity and was appropriately prosecuted,4 the legal system 
struggles to regulate forwarding market professionals—broker-
dealers and investment advisers5 who invest client funds with third 
parties such as Madoff. As of 2012, regulations did not usually impose 
fiduciary duties on broker-dealers and only nebulously described the 
fiduciary duties that investment advisers owe their clients.6 Scandals 
 
 3. Frances Romero, Bernie Madoff Scandal: Where Are They Now?, TIME (Mar. 12, 
2010), http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1971588_1971589_1971575,00
.html. 
 4. See generally The Madoff Case: A Timeline, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2009), http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB112966954231272304.html (providing a timeline of the events of the Madoff 
Ponzi scheme). 
 5. Throughout this Note, the terms “broker-dealers” and “investment advisers” generally 
reference financial institutions. Individual broker-dealers and investment advisers exist, but they 
often work for these larger financial institutions. 
 6. Under the framework created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 
881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006)), and the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940 (IAA), ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 
(2006)), broker-dealers need only make recommendations that are “suitable” to their clients. 
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such as Madoff’s investment scheme highlighted the need for more 
stringent regulatory standards, including heightened duties of due 
diligence and postinvestment monitoring, for forwarding market 
professionals. In this regard, the economic crisis of 2008 has presented 
lawmakers, administrative agencies, and jurists with new regulatory 
challenges.7 
In the aftermath of the Madoff scandal, regulators such as 
Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin focused their 
attention on the broker-dealers and investment advisers who invested 
client funds with Madoff.8 Regulators, for example, have targeted 
Fairfield Greenwich Group (FGG), which allegedly received 
coaching from Madoff to avoid Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) inquiries and had possessed at least constructive knowledge—
if not actual knowledge—of Madoff’s illegal Ponzi scheme.9 Despite 
Madoff’s suspect activities at the time, FGG did not notify its clients 
that it had invested their funds with Madoff.10 Because the due-
diligence standards created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(1934 Act)11 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA)12 did not 
clearly require FGG to report Madoff’s activities to clients, FGG was 
able to settle pending claims against it without admitting any 
wrongdoing.13 
Similarly, investment adviser J. Ezra Merkin, the head of the 
hedge fund Gabriel Capital Corporation, moved $2.4 billion of client 
 
Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers—What’s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 
36 (2005). Broker-dealers are excluded from regulation under the IAA as long as the advice 
they provide to clients is “solely incidental” to their brokerage services and they receive no 
“special compensation” for the advice. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2006); see also infra Part I. 
 7. See generally Douglas J. Elliott, Some Thoughts on US Financial Reforms, BROOKINGS 
(Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2010/1201_europe_economics/
elliott_working_paper.pdf (describing recent regulatory developments in response to the 
financial crisis). 
 8. Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Mass. Regulator Will Not Settle Madoff Feeder Suit, REUTERS, 
Aug. 14, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57D3X820090814 (“Galvin’s 
office is particularly interested in finding people who invested indirectly with Madoff by putting 
their money into funds that ultimately handed the cash to his firm . . . .”). 
 9. Beth Healy, Galvin Won’t Settle Madoff Case, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 14, 2009, at B7. 
 10. Herbst-Bayliss, supra note 8. 
 11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–78mm (2006)). 
 12. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006)). 
 13. In re Fairfield Greenwich Advisors LLC, No. 2009-0028, 2009 WL 3157459, at *1 
(Mass. Sec. Div. Sept. 8, 2009). 
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funds into Madoff’s investment scheme without his clients’ 
knowledge.14 By ignoring warnings that Madoff’s profits were “too 
good to be true,”15 Merkin failed to act in his clients’ best interests 
when he neglected to perform adequate due diligence and disclose his 
investment decisions to his clients.16 Although prosecutors have 
generally recognized the existence of some fiduciary duty to clients in 
these cases,17 regulations under the 1934 Act and the IAA offer 
limited guidance as to the extent of forwarding market professionals’ 
duties. 
Financial-services regulation has long merited attention and 
attempts at reform,18 and the Madoff scandal underscored the need 
for a new regulatory standard.19 By raising issues about whether and 
to what extent due diligence, postinvestment monitoring of 
investments, and disclosure of material facts are required,20 the 
Madoff scandal highlighted the particularly difficult problem of 
defining the fiduciary duties that broker-dealers and investment 
advisers owe their clients when investing funds with third parties. 
Technological advances in the financial-services industry and changes 
in the scope of services provided by broker-dealers have revealed 
both the inadequacies of the system created by the 1934 Act and the 
IAA and the need for a harmonized regulatory standard.21 Although 
 
 14. Martha Graybow, Merkin Charged with Civil Fraud in Madoff Case, REUTERS, Apr. 6, 
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53548420090406. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. (“New York University and other investors also have sued Merkin, saying he 
put their money with Madoff without their consent.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Robert Chew, Madoff Feeder Merkin Charged by Cuomo, TIME (Apr. 6, 
2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1889740,00.html (“In total, Merkin is 
charged with 720 breaches of fiduciary duty in raising, through social and charitable 
connections, over $4 billion, which he turned over to third-party money managers, like 
Madoff.”). 
 18. For instance, in 2005, the SEC allowed broker-dealers to charge asset-based fees and 
still avoid regulation as investment advisers in certain circumstances. Certain Broker-Dealers 
Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 51523, Advisers Act 
Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 (Apr. 12, 2005). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit vacated the SEC’s new rule in 2007. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 
482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-
Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 398 (2010) (discussing this sequence of 
events). 
 19. See Elliott, supra note 7, at 7 (“I believe that the legislative and regulatory changes do 
considerably more good than harm and are of real value . . . .”). 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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scholars have contemplated certain regulatory changes,22 such as 
eliminating the broker-dealer exclusion in the IAA,23 such suggestions 
presuppose a division between brokerage and advisory services24 that 
does not reflect actual developments in the financial-services market. 
In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),25 Congress created the opportunity 
to reform in the financial-services industry by giving the SEC 
discretion to establish a new framework of forwarding market 
professionals’ fiduciary duties.26 Specifically, section 913(g) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act allows the SEC, after a six-month study period, to 
recognize a new fiduciary duty for broker-dealers and investment 
advisers.27 The SEC, after conducting such a study, described the need 
for a new heightened fiduciary duty, but it has yet to articulate the 
contours of that duty.28 This Note proposes an innovative approach to 
the regulation of forwarding market professionals by applying agency 
principles to create the new framework. Agency law provides a strong 
conception of the duties of due diligence and postinvestment 
monitoring that forwarding market professionals owe their clients and 
would remedy deficiencies in the regulatory structure created by the 
1934 Act and the IAA. Regardless of the statutory distinctions 
between broker-dealers and investment advisers, these financial 
institutions owe their clients fiduciary duties clearly defined in agency 
law when they invest funds with third parties. 
Part I of this Note explores the fiduciary duties that forwarding 
market professionals owe their clients for third-party investments 
under case law, the 1934 Act, and the IAA, and argues for a revised 
fiduciary standard. It first provides a brief regulatory history of 
broker-dealers and investment advisers. It then describes the low bar 
set by the “suitability” standard for broker-dealers and explains how, 
 
 22. See, e.g., Black, supra note 6, at 54–55 (arguing that broker-dealers should be 
prohibited from holding themselves out as advisers and that their obligations should be 
expanded if they hold themselves out as more than broker-dealers); Laby, supra note 18, at 399 
(proposing the harmonization of regulations of investment advisers and broker-dealers because 
such individuals no longer offer different services). 
 23. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2006). 
 24. See infra Part I. 
 25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 26. See infra notes 202–11 and accompanying text. 
 27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g), 124 Stat. at 
1828–29 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)–(l), 80b-11(g)–(h)) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 28. See infra notes 206–08 and accompanying text. 
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even when a fiduciary duty is established for forwarding market 
professionals, the applicable framework promotes silence instead of 
an affirmative duty of care toward clients. Part II of this Note 
discusses the general application of agency principles to the financial-
services industry and describes how broker-dealers and investment 
advisers form agency relationships with their clients. Part III then 
articulates the clearly defined fiduciary duties these forwarding 
market professionals would owe their clients under an agency-law 
framework and outlines how these duties could have been applied to 
forwarding market professionals involved in the Madoff scandal. 
I.  THE INADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO CLIENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE 1934 ACT AND THE IAA 
The system of obligations and fiduciary duties for broker-dealers 
and investment advisers created by the 1934 Act and the IAA does 
not adequately protect clients from abuse. Section A of this Part 
provides a brief history of the regulatory framework governing 
broker-dealers and investment advisers. Section B then describes the 
sources of the obligations that broker-dealers have toward their 
clients with respect to funds managed by third parties. Lastly, Section 
C argues that even when a fiduciary duty is established for investment 
advisers under the framework created by the 1934 Act and the IAA, 
it promotes silence on the part of forwarding market professionals 
and does not effectively define the affirmative duties that these 
professionals owe their clients in the context of third-party 
investments. 
A. Implications of the Historical Divide Between Broker-Dealers and 
Investment Advisers 
The regulatory history of broker-dealers and investment advisers 
explains the complex and indeterminate fiduciary duties that these 
forwarding market professionals have traditionally owed their clients. 
The 1934 Act defines brokers as persons “engaged in the business of 
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.”29 The 
1938 Maloney Act30 amendments to the 1934 Act established a system 
 
 29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2006). 
 30. Maloney Act, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o–3 
(2006)) (adding section 15A to the 1934 Act). 
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of self-regulation for broker-dealers through the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD), an organization whose functions 
would later be assumed by the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA).31 
Investment advisers occupy a different market niche. The IAA 
defines an investment adviser as “any person who, for compensation, 
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities.”32 Rather 
than provide transactional brokerage services like those supplied by 
broker-dealers, investment advisers offer continuous financial advice 
to clients and are compensated separately for their services. 
Investment advisers charge an asset-based fee for continued 
discretionary management of investments.33 Broker-dealers generally 
charge commission-based fees for their services,34 although some 
broker-dealers also provide advisory services for a separate fee.35 
The IAA, which establishes a broker-dealer exclusion,36 further 
sharpens the distinction between investment advisers and broker-
dealers. This exclusion prevents regulation of broker-dealers under 
the IAA if the advice provided by such professionals is “solely 
incidental” to brokerage services and if the broker-dealers do not 
receive “special compensation” for the advice.37 An examination of 
congressional intent sheds light on the rationale for excluding broker-
dealers from regulation under the IAA: because broker-dealers were 
already regulated under the 1934 Act, Congress likely did not intend 
the IAA to apply to institutions already facing federal regulation.38 
 
 31. Maloney Act, 52 Stat. at 1070 (“Any association of brokers or dealers may be 
registered with the Commission as a national securities association pursuant to [the 
requirements of the Maloney Act and the SEC]. . . .”); see also Stephen J. Nelson, Commentary: 
A Gap in Regulation of the OTC Markets, TRADERS MAG. (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.traders
magazine.com/news/otc-markets-finra-corporate-actions-104993-1.html (“To correct this 
oversight, Congress created Section 15A of the Exchange Act in 1938, which instituted 
something called a ‘national securities association.’ The National Association of Securities 
Dealers, Inc., FINRA’s predecessor, was established in 1939.” (quoting Maloney Act, 52 Stat. at 
1070)). 
 32. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006). 
 33. Id. (defining the scope of investment advisers’ activities). 
 34. Laby, supra note 18, at 400. 
 35. Id. at 401. 
 36. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C). 
 37. Id.; Laby, supra note 18, at 403. 
 38. See Black, supra note 6, at 41 (“In the SEC’s view, the congressional intent behind the 
IAA was to regulate as investment advisers those persons whose activities were not already 
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Nevertheless, an earlier draft of the IAA did not explicitly exclude 
broker-dealers from coverage,39 and the exclusion was added later 
without commentary.40 Although this exclusion made sense in an era 
when broker-dealers provided a significant transactional service, 
technological advances since the drafting of the 1934 Act and the 
IAA have rendered this reasoning outdated.41 
Although broker-dealers and investment advisers have 
historically operated under this dichotomous framework, subsequent 
legislative action has recognized the need for reform. The Dodd-
Frank Act, passed on July 21, 2010,42 presents an apt opportunity for 
the SEC to establish a new framework of fiduciary duties for financial 
institutions. 
B. The Limited Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers 
As of 2012, regulations only weakly defined the duties that 
broker-dealers and investment advisers owe their clients. Broker-
dealers generally have no fiduciary duties to their clients, and the 
fiduciary duties of investment advisers do not adequately establish 
the level of due diligence required for third-party investments. 
 
subject to federal securities regulation. Since broker-dealers were already regulated under the 
[1934 Act], Congress carved out an exclusion to permit broker-dealers to provide investment 
advice to their brokerage customers without subjecting them to additional regulation.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 39. S. 3580, 76th Cong. § 45(a)(16) (1940); see also Black, supra note 6, at 41–42 (describing 
the ambiguous legislative history surrounding the broker-dealer exclusion). 
 40. S. 4108, 76th Cong. § 22(a)(11) (1940); H.R. 10065, 76th Cong. § 202(a)(11) (1940); see 
also Black, supra note 6, at 42 (“In this version, Title II had its own definitional section and its 
own definition of ‘investment adviser’ that included the broker exclusion. There was no 
commentary explaining the addition.” (footnote omitted)). 
 41. See Laby, supra note 18, at 412 (“Changes in securities trading brought about by 
changes in technology have rendered brokerage a commodity, which no longer entails the level 
of judgment and skill required to conduct brokerage services in the bygone era of the early 
twentieth century.”); see also id. at 404 (“The tidy separation between brokers and advisers 
began to crumble initially in the 1980s when brokers started to offer financial planning services, 
and more significantly in the 1990s when brokerage firms began to use titles such as ‘adviser’ or 
‘financial adviser’ for their broker-dealer registered representatives and even encouraged 
customers to think of the registered representative more as an adviser than a 
stockbroker. . . . [U]se of such labels should put one on notice that the advice is no longer ‘solely 
incidental’ to brokerage. Regulators, however, did not respond to this marketing move, and the 
broker-dealer exclusion continued to separate brokers from advisers.”). 
 42. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
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1. Broker-Dealers.  Under the system created by the 1934 Act 
and the IAA, broker-dealers must adhere to a mere suitability 
standard, which requires only that broker-dealers provide 
recommendations for investments that meet clients’ specific needs.43 
Unless broker-dealers have advisory discretion over a client’s 
investments, they are not bound by fiduciary duties and thus have no 
further obligations to their clients beyond the point of sale.44 
Therefore, broker-dealers generally do not have a duty to monitor 
client investments after an initial transaction.45 
Because broker-dealers usually have no fiduciary duties to their 
clients under the 1934 Act and its related regulations, they can 
proceed with self-dealing transactions as long as the transactions are 
also suitable for their clients46 and they disclose the self-dealing to 
their clients.47 Although this system facilitates broker-dealers’ acting 
as principals in transactions with their clients,48 it also opens the field 
to abusive practices. For example, under the suitability standard, 
broker-dealers are not obligated to recommend the best possible 
investment option for their clients or to act in their clients’ best 
interests.49 The potential for abuse under such a standard is made 
even greater by the fact that the requirement to disclose self-dealing 
has been narrowly interpreted by courts.50 For instance, in Shivangi v. 
 
 43. See Black, supra note 6, at 36 (“When making a recommendation to purchase a 
security, broker-dealers have obligations to make only recommendations that are suitable for 
the customer, based on the customer’s financial situation and financial objectives.”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 36–37. 
 47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (2011). 
 48. Because broker-dealers do not usually establish a fiduciary relationship with their 
clients under the framework set up by the 1934 Act and the IAA, they can engage in self-dealing 
by selling securities to clients from their own accounts as principals. See Laby, supra note 18, at 
407 (“Particularly in non-discretionary accounts, brokers are not typically considered 
fiduciaries. Notwithstanding the prospect of owing fiduciary obligations, the primary reason 
many brokers oppose application of the Advisers Act is due to restrictions on conducting 
principal transactions imposed on advisers but not brokers.” (footnote omitted)). 
 49. See David Serchuk, Suitability: Where Brokers Fail, FORBES (June 24, 2009, 6:00 AM 
EDT), http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/23/suitability-standards-fiduciary-intelligent-investing-
brokers.html (“Your stock broker or investment adviser could be a straight arrow, scouring the 
financial world for the very best products, but it’s entirely likely they aren’t. They could just as 
easily push you into ‘house’ products that help them reap better commissions. The fact is, the 
latter situation is far from uncommon as brokers are typically not legally bound to find the ‘best’ 
products for you, merely ones that are considered ‘suitable.’”). 
 50. See, e.g., Benzon v. Morgan Stanley, No. 3:03-0159, 2004 WL 62747, at *1, *4 (M.D. 
Tenn. Jan. 8, 2004) (dismissing claims brought against Morgan Stanley for its failure to disclose 
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Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,51 the Fifth Circuit declined to hold the 
defendant brokerage firm liable for “failing to disclose that [its] 
account executives receive[d] higher compensation for principal 
trades of over-the-counter stocks in which Dean Witter [was] a 
market maker than for other sales.”52 Critically, the court determined 
that the brokerage firm had not intended to deceive its clients.53 
Even when broker-dealers have fiduciary duties because they 
take on an advisory role, the framework provided by the 1934 Act 
and the IAA does not adequately define such duties in a postsale 
context.54 The IAA, which regulates broker-dealers who do not meet 
the criteria for the broker-dealer exclusion,55 fails to elaborate on 
postinvestment fiduciary duties. 
2. Investment Advisers.  Unlike broker-dealers, investment 
advisers have broad fiduciary duties to their clients under the IAA, 
related regulations,56 and relevant case law.57 These fiduciary duties 
 
the allocations and incentives it had given to employees to sell certain investments); Castillo v. 
Dean Witter Discover & Co., No. 97 Civ. 1272(RPP), 1998 WL 342050, at *9, *11 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 25, 1998) (holding that a brokerage firm was not liable for failing to disclose that its 
“brokers [had] received more compensation in conjunction with the sale of Dean Witter 
proprietary products than in conjunction with the sale of other products”); Black, supra note 6, 
at 37 (“Courts, however, have not held firms liable for failing to disclose that the firm’s 
compensation system may give account executives incentives to sell particular securities.”). 
 51. Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 52. Id. at 886. 
 53. See id. at 889 (“The record supports the district court’s finding of no actual intent to 
deceive. The record contains no evidence that Aitken or Dean Witter actually intended to 
deceive the Shivangis by failing to disclose the compensation information, nor does it establish 
that Aitken recommended the stock because of his unusual compensation. Rather, Aitken 
recommended Keldon Oil stock because Dean Witter’s best analyst considered it a good 
investment.”). If a client asks for investment advice and broker-dealers provide false or 
misleading information, the broker-dealers may be liable for fraud, but this liability does not 
arise from fiduciary duties. Black, supra note 6, at 36. 
 54. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 55. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 56. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2011) (“If you are an investment adviser registered or 
required to be registered under section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 
80b-3), it shall be unlawful within the meaning of section 206 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80b-6) for 
you to provide investment advice to clients unless you: (a) . . . . Adopt and implement written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violation, by you and your supervised 
persons, of the Act and the rules that the Commission has adopted under the Act . . . .”). When 
claims arise against investment advisers, plaintiffs often use Rule 10b-5 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011), see, e.g., IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v. Gleacher 
NatWest Inc., [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,471, ¶ 96,826 (D. Minn. 
May 1, 2001) (holding that a failure to disclose to clients material facts relating to an investment 
constituted a Rule 10b-5 violation). 
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arise from investment advisers’ advisory role and nominally 
encompass both initial investments and postinvestment monitoring.58 
Investment advisers must obtain written prior consent from clients 
before initiating self-dealing transactions and must also advise clients 
of potential conflicts of interest.59 Despite these safeguards, the 
fiduciary duties of investment advisers pose serious implementation 
problems and are not adequately defined in the postinvestment 
context. 
For instance, although investment advisers must perform some 
initial due diligence, the degree of that due diligence and the extent to 
which investment advisers must disclose their findings to clients are 
unclear. Generally, due diligence “in the corporate finance 
context . . . refer[s] to the process of investigating a company’s 
business, legal and financial affairs in preparation for a possible 
transaction.”60 Nonetheless, the specific due-diligence requirements 
for potential investments with third parties are ambiguous and may 
vary greatly.61 Given such variance, investment advisers often 
negotiate due-diligence measures with their clients as a matter of 
contract.62 
Due diligence can entail “perform[ing] a sensitivity analysis to 
determine the key drivers and risk factors for [a] business,” 
“review[ing] [a] company’s capital expenditure plans (for 
maintenance and for growth),” “compar[ing] [a] company’s key 
financial statistics with the statistics of competitors,” and 
 
 57. E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (“The 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate 
fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship.’” (quoting 2 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961)); see also Black, supra note 6, at 38 (“It is well established that 
the relationship between an investment adviser and his customer is a fiduciary one.”). 
 58. See Black, supra note 6, at 38 (“[W]here the investment adviser’s duties include 
management of the account, he is under an obligation to monitor the performance of the 
account to make appropriate changes in the portfolio.”). 
 59. Id. 
 60. John J. Clarke, Jr. & Lisa Firenze, Due Diligence and Potential Liabilities, in HOW TO 
PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 2008, at 119, 128 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1702, 2008). 
 61. See id. (“The determination of how much diligence is necessary or appropriate or what 
constitutes a ‘reasonable investigation’ generally will vary depending on the specific facts and 
circumstances.” (quoting Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (2006))). 
 62. See Douglas J. Schulz, Due Diligence: Securities Applications and Regulatory 
Requirements, 2011, 17 PIABA B.J. 353, 357 (2010) (“[I]t’s not uncommon for a private 
placement memorandum (PPM) or prospectus to state that the general partner or investment 
advisor will conduct ‘due diligence’ as to any investments made.”). 
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“calculat[ing] whether [a] debt or equity offering will cause [a] 
company to violate financial covenants in the company’s financing 
documents.”63 Although a wide array of possible due-diligence 
measures exists, “[it] is difficult to establish a uniform set of due 
diligence procedures for all transactions. . . . Steps that are 
appropriate for one offering may not be appropriate for another.”64 In 
the financial-services industry, this lack of uniformity leads to 
uncertainty regarding what specific duties of due diligence investment 
advisers owe their clients.65 
Given the lack of transparency in the financial-services market,66 
investment advisers sometimes fail either to perform the basic level of 
due diligence or to disclose negative results to clients. For instance, in 
the aftermath of the Madoff scandal, some clients sued financial 
institutions that had invested client funds with Madoff for breach of 
contract and failure to perform due diligence.67 Nevertheless, clients 
usually cannot identify potential claims against financial institutions 
until after the damage has been done—largely because of the lack of 
transparency and the reactionary nature of the regulatory system.68 
 
 63. Valerie Ford Jacob, The Due Diligence Process from the Underwriter’s Perspective, in 
CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE IN M&A AND SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2009, at 135, 146 (PLI 
Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1746, 2009) (describing the various 
responsibilities of due diligence); see also Clarke & Firenze, supra note 60, at 131–33 (providing 
another list of various aspects of due diligence for financial firms). 
 64. Clarke & Firenze, supra note 60, at 128. 
 65. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Michael Barr, Assistant Sec’y for Fin. Insts., U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks 
at the Financial Times Global Finance Forum on “Reforming the Global Financial System” 
(Feb. 12, 2010), available at http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-resources/news/assistant-
us-treasury-secretary-for-financial-institutions-michael-barr-remarks- (“The financial sector, 
under the guise of innovation, piled ill-considered risk upon risk. The lack of transparency hid 
the growing wedge in incentives facing different players in the system.”). 
 67. See Sanford P. Dumain, The Madoff Fraud: A Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Perspective, in 
RESPONSE TO PONZI AND OTHER SCHEMES: ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUNDS UNDER 
SCRUTINY, 43, 48 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbooks Ser. No. 1758, 2009) 
(“There have been numerous complaints filed alleging that defendants breached their fiduciary 
duty by not conducting sufficient due diligence or in failing to exercise reasonable care in 
connection with their clients’ investments. . . . Investors may be able to sue their investment 
advisers and/or other third parties on the basis of breach of contract.”). Professor Dumain 
further elaborates that claims may arise under unjust enrichment, common-law fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and other causes of action. Id. at 48–49. 
 68. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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C. Silence—Not Disclosure—Appears To Be the Governing Principle 
Even when adequate due diligence has been performed, case law 
sets a low threshold for disclosing results to clients by punishing only 
misstatements of material fact.69 Because usually only 
misstatements—not omissions—give rise to liability, investment 
advisers and broker-dealers often remain silent about the benefits 
and detriments of potential third-party investments. Cases such as 
Van Alstyne, Noel & Co.70 and Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.71 
show that, because the regulatory system focuses on active 
misstatements and does not adequately define affirmative duties, 
forwarding market professionals often remain silent about negative 
aspects of potential third-party investments to avoid liability.72 As the 
Supreme Court has said, “Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not 
misleading . . . .”73 
For instance, in Van Alstyne, the SEC sanctioned a broker-dealer 
for making positive statements about a potential investment when he 
possessed material nonpublic information revealing negative 
attributes about the company.74 Although the undisclosed information 
had been confidential, the SEC ruled that Van Alstyne, the broker-
dealer, should not have made any statements concerning the company 
in question because once the firm had volunteered positive 
information, it should also have revealed negative information.75 The 
ruling in Van Alstyne properly disciplined the particular market 
 
 69. See Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. 
L. REV. 75, 133–41 (2004) (outlining sources of fiduciary duties for financial institutions). 
 70. Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 4699, 33 S.E.C. 311 (Apr. 8, 
1952). 
 71. Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968). 
 72. Many forwarding market professionals have taken further steps to protect themselves 
by establishing “Chinese walls,” or barriers to the flow of nonpublic information within the firm. 
Laby, supra note 69, at 139–40. Even though these Chinese walls may promote compliance with 
duties of loyalty, they can also work against clients’ best interests because “the institution would 
not be using all information that it had received to the benefit of a particular customer.” Tender 
Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6239, Exchange Act Release No. 17,120, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 11,336, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,415 (Sept. 12, 1980). 
 73. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1987); see also Laby, supra note 69, at 
136–37 (“[W]hen upholding a duty of loyalty to one person (preserving confidentiality), one 
may not breach a duty of loyalty (affirmative misstatements) to another. . . . If questioned on a 
matter about which one has confidential information, one must remain silent. If the truth calls 
for breaching confidentiality, the only option is to say nothing at all.”). 
 74. Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 4699, 33 S.E.C. at 312–17. 
 75. Id. at 321. 
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professional in question,76 but its logic may lead to two problems in 
practice. First, Van Alstyne’s reasoning incentivizes silence in the first 
instance to avoid incurring a duty of full disclosure; second, it fails to 
define what specific due-diligence obligations financial institutions 
owe their clients in the context of third-party investments. 
Similarly, the fiduciary standard nominally addresses the 
continued monitoring of third-party investments, but it does so 
weakly because it focuses only on active misstatements. In Black, a 
financial institution was found liable for fraud because it had made 
positive statements concerning a potential investment even though a 
partner on the company’s board later discovered the investment was 
faltering.77 Although the partner had not initially known his 
statements were false, he had “permitted them to stand after he 
learned the truth and before respondents relied on them.”78 The court 
concluded that the partner had a duty to correct his earlier, 
innocently made misstatement.79 Although the court properly 
described the partner’s duty to disclose material postinvestment 
information, it did not provide any guidelines for an affirmative duty 
to perform postinvestment monitoring. Rather, it focused on the duty 
to disclose once relevant postinvestment information has been 
discovered. 
The elaborations found in statutes, regulations, and case law of 
the fiduciary duties that forwarding market professionals owe clients 
for third-party investments do not adequately protect clients. The 
existing framework fails to define the affirmative duties forwarding 
market professionals owe their clients in the context of third-party 
investments and sets a weak regulatory standard by focusing on active 
misstatements. Broker-dealers and investment advisers, aware that 
partial disclosure creates a duty to disclose fully all aspects of a 
prospective investment, often remain silent to limit their liability.80 
Additionally, although these financial institutions have a duty to 
disclose material facts that they discover in the postinvestment 
context, case law does not impose an affirmative duty to perform 
 
 76. Id. at 312–17. 
 77. Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 157, 158–59 (Ct. App. 1968). 
 78. Id. at 159–60. 
 79. See id. at 162 (holding the defendant liable for not correcting his misstatement). 
 80. In the context of Van Alstyne, Professor Arthur Laby elaborates, “[O]nce the broker 
released positive information about the company, it had a duty to disclose negative information 
as well. The firm should have simply refrained from making statements regarding the company’s 
prospects.” Laby, supra note 69, at 134–135. 
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postinvestment monitoring of investments. Clients would benefit 
greatly from the establishment of a concrete affirmative duty for 
financial institutions to perform postinvestment monitoring when 
client funds are handled by third parties.81 
II.  ESTABLISHING A FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY LAW 
Demonstrating the need for more clearly specified fiduciary 
duties in the financial-services industry constitutes only the first step 
toward remedying the problems created by the framework of the 1934 
Act and the IAA.82 This Part II argues that although scholars and 
regulators have overlooked agency law as a potential source for 
defining forwarding market professionals’ fiduciary duties, agency 
principles are nonetheless applicable to the financial-services context. 
Section A describes how agency relationships often arise between 
forwarding market professionals and their clients. Section B describes 
the relevance of agency law to the financial-services industry and 
argues that agency law has the potential to resolve common criticisms 
against expanding the fiduciary duties of broker-dealers and 
investment advisers. 
A. Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers Often Establish Agency 
Relationships with Their Clients 
Independent of the regulatory framework established by the 
1934 Act and the IAA, forwarding market professionals often form 
agency relationships with their clients when they invest client funds 
with third parties. Under agency law, a fiduciary relationship “arises 
when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person 
(an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and 
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act.”83 Contractual terms or industry norms 
do not determine the existence of an agency relationship; rather, an 
 
 81. See infra notes 173–80 and accompanying text. 
 82. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943) (“But to say that a man is a 
fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? 
What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these 
obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?”). 
 83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
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agency relationship is determined by mutual assent between an agent 
and a principal.84 
Because agency law focuses on the mutual assent of a principal 
and an agent, rather than on distinctions regarding whether advice 
was “solely incidental” to transactional services,85 attention should be 
given to the reasonable expectations of both the client and the 
forwarding market professional. Financial institutions and their 
clients, in actions if not in words, often consent to an agency 
relationship that mandates continued monitoring and due diligence. 
Clients, for their part, expect a fiduciary relationship and assent to an 
interaction in which broker-dealers and investment advisers will guide 
them through the investment process as their financial agents. A poll 
of 1,319 clients of financial institutions revealed that “[m]any of them 
[were] wrong in their belief that . . . broker-dealers . . . are currently 
held to a fiduciary standard.”86 Moreover, broker-dealers often 
embrace this misconception by marketing themselves as financial 
agents.87 Even though mutual assent to the consequent relationship 
might not be explicit, a manifestation of assent does not necessarily 
have to occur in writing under agency law, but rather can be derived 
from words or actions.88 When a financial institution and its clients 
mutually agree to enter a business relationship involving continuous 
advice and monitoring of investments, they establish a broad agency 
relationship. 
Although agency law has not yet been applied to forwarding 
market professionals’ investing activities with third parties, courts 
have previously held that financial institutions can generally establish 
agency relationships with their clients. For instance, in Merrill Lynch 
 
 84. See id. § 1.02 (“An agency relationship arises only when the elements stated in § 1.01 
are present. Whether a relationship is characterized as agency in an agreement between parties 
or in the context of industry or popular usage is not controlling.”); see also id. § 8.07 (“An agent 
has a duty to act in accordance with the express and implied terms of any contract between the 
agent and the principal.”). 
 85. See supra Part I.A. 
 86. Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas LTD LLP, Most Investors Want Fiduciary Standard 
for Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, Say Trade Groups to SEC, STOCKBROKER FRAUD 
BLOG (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.stockbrokerfraudblog.com/2010/10/most_investors_want_
fiduciary.html. In 2010, a number of trade organizations sent a letter to SEC Chairman Mary 
Schapiro highlighting this survey of clients of financial institutions. Id. 
 87. See infra note 41. 
 88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03 (“A person manifests assent or 
intention through written or spoken words or other conduct.”). 
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Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng,89 the D.C. Circuit held that 
Merrill Lynch had violated duties derived from its agency 
relationship90 with Cheng, its client, by overpurchasing options in 
violation of specific instructions from Cheng.91 Similarly, in Magnum 
Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc.,92 the Fifth Circuit found a 
violation of a duty derived from an agency relationship93 when 
Lehman Brothers purchased stocks on behalf of its clients despite 
increases in the stock prices from the original prices quoted to the 
clients.94 
Investment advisers often establish a broad agency relationship 
with their clients because the parties mutually assent to a continuous 
business interaction involving discretionary advice and 
postinvestment monitoring.95 For example, in IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v. 
Gleacher NatWest, Inc.,96 investment advisers were found to be agents 
of their clients when they purchased $62 million in debt securities 
issued by the defendant to fund the expansion of a foreign steel mill 
for their clients’ accounts.97 
Broker-dealers require closer analysis. Broker-dealers, by 
definition, act on behalf of their clients.98 Because both parties assent 
to their roles, an agency relationship exists. Still, the scope of this 
relationship may be narrower than that of investment advisers and 
their clients because traditional broker-dealers generally provide only 
transactional services as opposed to continuous advisory services.99 In 
 
 89. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng, 901 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 90. Id. at 1128 (“We hold that basic principles of agency law control here and that those 
principles required Grace to inform the Chengs of their right to reject the unauthorized 
options.”). 
 91. Id. at 1126. 
 92. Magnum Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 794 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 93. Id. at 200 (“The relationship between a securities broker and its customer is that of 
principal and agent . . . .”). 
 94. Id. at 199. 
 95. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 96. IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v. Gleacher NatWest Inc., [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,471 (D. Minn. May 1, 2001).  
 97. See id. ¶ 96,827 (“The Investment Advisers were the agents for the Plaintiffs when it 
made the decision to purchase and/or purchased the Notes on behalf of Plaintiffs.”). 
 98. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2006) (defining broker-
dealers as persons “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account 
of others”). 
 99. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
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Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,100 although 
the court found an agency relationship between the broker-dealer 
and its client,101 it also found that this relationship entailed no more 
than the obligation “simply to buy and sell.”102 According to the 
court’s description, the relationship ended when the transaction had 
been completed: “The risk of the venture [was] upon the customer 
who profit[ed] if it succeed[ed] and los[t] if it fail[ed].”103 Additionally, 
as cases such as Walston & Co. v. Miller104 demonstrate, the agency 
relationship between a broker-dealer and its clients can also extend 
over a number of transactions, leading to further fiduciary duties 
under agency law.105 In Walston, the client had hired a broker-dealer 
to purchase and sell sugar contracts over a four-month period, 
establishing an agency relationship for that term.106 
Thus, agency law often creates a strong fiduciary relationship 
between forwarding market professionals and their clients—a 
relationship that ought to shift the relevant analysis away from the 
arbitrary distinctions of the regulatory system imposed by the 1934 
Act and the IAA. Rather than adhering to a distinction between 
broker-dealers and investment advisers, agency law creates a uniform 
framework that establishes fiduciary duties for forwarding market 
professionals whenever clients trust these financial institutions to act 
on their behalf with regard to third-party investments. 
B. The Relevance of Agency Law to the Financial-Services Industry 
Regulators and academics have largely ignored the application of 
agency law to financial institutions.107 In this regard, establishing an 
 
 100. Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 107, 110 (N.D. 
Ala. 1971), aff’d, 453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 101. Id. at 111. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Walston & Co. v. Miller, 410 P.2d 658 (Ariz. 1966) (en banc). 
 105. Id. at 660 (describing an agency relationship between a broker-dealer and its client that 
extended over a four-month period). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor 
and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2003) (“To many legal academics, agency law is 
a backwater subject, long banished from the formal law school training except for brief 
introductory reference in corporations or business associations.”). Some scholars have begun to 
recognize the general application of agency law to the financial industry, although this concept 
has not yet been applied to forwarding market professionals. See, e.g., Claire Moore Dickerson, 
From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 955, 986 (1995) (“As an offshoot of the law of trusts, agency theory imposes this same 
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agency framework for fiduciary duties represents a shift from the 
deficient statutory distinction between broker-dealers and investment 
advisers.108 The inattention to the relevance of agency law in this 
context has forgone a potentially useful vehicle for describing the 
fiduciary relationships that both broker-dealers and investment 
advisers often establish with their clients.109 Agency law “permeates 
an extraordinary amount of everyday law,”110 including many aspects 
of business law.111 Moreover, the law of agency is malleable and 
informed by decades of experience in a variety of settings; its 
principles and holdings are well tested.112 This flexibility allows agency 
law to avoid many of the criticisms that some scholars have expressed 
concerning the expansion of fiduciary duties for forwarding market 
professionals. 
For instance, despite the arguments of some scholars that 
contract law sufficiently protects clients,113 agency law presents a more 
feasible safeguard for client funds invested with third parties. 
Although clients could theoretically contract to ensure that 
forwarding market professionals sufficiently perform due-diligence 
procedures, “the transaction costs involved in drawing up a detailed 
prior agreement covering all possible discretionary uses of power 
over the life of the relation would not only be enormous, but also 
would probably exceed the benefits of the proposed relation.”114 More 
general documents that would limit transaction costs might fail to 
 
unrelentingly high duty on the agent as fiduciary. The agency relationship is important because 
it is a standard business form.” (footnote omitted)); Laby, supra note 18, at 414 (“If a broker 
holds itself out as an adviser, and a customer responds by hiring the broker to act on her behalf, 
this response triggers an agency relationship and a fiduciary obligation extending to matters 
within the scope of the agency.”). But cf. Langevoort, supra at 1189 (“[A]gency law itself has not 
systematically been evaluated to see whether, or how well, its black-letter rules fit when the 
principal is an organization and the problem under consideration operates at agency’s shared 
border with corporation law.”). See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and 
Purchases of Unrecommended Securities: An Agency Theory of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535 (2005) (arguing that agency law could establish a fiduciary duty for broker-
dealers to warn clients that an unrecommended purchase is unsuitable). 
 108. See supra notes 29–37 and accompanying text. 
 109. See Langevoort, supra note 107, at 1188 (“[I]ntellectual inattention to such a profound 
area of private ordering is dangerous.”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. (“[Agency law] appl[ies] anyplace that one person (the agent) agrees to act on 
behalf of another (the principal) to carry out the principal’s affairs under the principal’s control. 
It covers most employment relationships, and a good bit else.” (footnote omitted)). 
 112. See infra Part III.A. 
 113. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 813 (1983). 
 114. Id. 
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provide the specificity needed to protect individual clients.115 
Conversely, a fiduciary duty arising from agency-law principles would 
allow for a flexible framework that would avoid these transaction 
costs yet still establish specific obligations supported by a substantial 
body of case law. 
Furthermore, although some cases have described how contract 
law’s implied covenant of good faith protects clients,116 failure to 
perform due diligence with respect to third-party investments is often 
not consistent with the type of good-faith understanding envisioned in 
such cases.117 For instance, although some forwarding market 
professionals, such as FGG, allegedly acted in bad faith by investing 
client funds with Madoff despite actual or constructive knowledge of 
his illegal activity, many others merely failed to perform adequate 
due diligence and did not necessarily act in bad faith.118 As the 
following Part of this Note describes,119 an agency framework would 
establish affirmative duties of initial due diligence and postinvestment 
monitoring independent of the duty of good faith. 
Although some scholars contend that market mechanisms can 
successfully regulate the financial-services industry and negate the 
need for a heightened fiduciary duty,120 in practice, disparities in 
information and industry sophistication between financial institutions 
and their clients limit the application of such market mechanisms.121 
As was seen with the financial institutions that invested with Madoff, 
clients largely do not raise due-diligence concerns when they are 
enjoying steady profits.122 Clients of FGG, for example, did not begin 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986) (noting that if the 
negotiating parties “would have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of as a breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith,” then the act indeed would have constituted such a breach). 
 117. See, e.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 386–92 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding 
agents liable for their failure to perform adequate due diligence even though the court implicitly 
acknowledged that the agents did not act in bad faith). This case is discussed further in Part 
III.A. 
 118. See supra notes 8–17 and accompanying text. 
 119. See infra Part III. 
 120. See Frankel, supra note 113, at 812 (“If the entrustor has the power to terminate the 
fiduciary relation, the fiduciary may be deterred from abusing his power. Additionally, a 
fiduciary competing in the market for employment may wish to please his entrustor in order to 
enhance his reputation, to obtain more business, or to advance in the employee ranks.”). 
 121. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Graybow, supra note 14 (noting that investment adviser Merkin accepted $470 
million in fees while investing with Madoff). 
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to question their investments until the market collapsed in 2008.123 
Also, because market mechanisms correct relevant issues in an ex 
post rather than an ex ante manner, they do little to protect client 
funds before a loss is realized, as seen in the case of FGG. Agency 
law, by contrast, outlines clear ex ante fiduciary duties that 
forwarding market professionals owe their clients in the context of 
third-party investments. 
III.  THE SPECIFIC DUTIES FORWARDING MARKET PROFESSIONALS 
WOULD OWE THEIR CLIENTS FOR THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS 
UNDER AGENCY LAW 
This Part outlines the specific fiduciary duties that forwarding 
market professionals would owe their clients according to an agency 
framework and then considers how these duties would have applied 
to particular cases in the financial-services industry. First, Section A 
uses the Restatement (Third) of Agency124 and relevant case law to 
elaborate on the specific duties that arise under agency law as applied 
to forwarding market professionals. Although agency law has not yet 
been applied to broker-dealers and investment advisers engaging in 
third-party investments,125 analogous agency cases in various 
commercial contexts illuminate relevant principles. Next, Section B 
examines events in the financial-services industry, such as the Madoff 
investment scandal, and highlights how fiduciary duties arising from 
agency law could have been applied to these broker-dealers and 
investment advisers. As examples from the financial-services industry 
show, agency law could be used effectively to define clear fiduciary 
duties for forwarding market professionals with respect to client 
funds handled by third parties. Finally, Section C explains how a 
regulatory framework for forwarding market professionals based on 
agency principles could be implemented under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
 123. See Healy, supra note 9 (“More recently, as the 2008 stock market collapse gathered 
steam, Fairfield clients pressured the firm to explain Madoff’s operation and strategy. The 
executives could not answer many of these questions, and acknowledged in internal e-mails the 
gaps in their knowledge. Yet, according to Galvin’s complaint and prehearing memorandum, 
they continued to assure customers they had done ample due diligence.”); see also Frankel, 
supra note 113, at 812–13 (“[T]he power to terminate is an ineffective safeguard unless the 
entrustor can discover the abuse of power and the fiduciary knows he is subject to scrutiny.”). 
 124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (2006). 
 125. See supra Part II. 
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A. Agency Law’s Exacting Standard 
Agency law provides a framework of clearly defined duties that 
could be applied to broker-dealers and investment advisers that they 
invest client funds with third parties. Fiduciary duties based on 
agency law would include duties of care, competence, diligence, and 
good conduct on the part of the fiduciary to maximize the value of its 
clients’ property.126 Cases applying agency law illustrate that when 
these forwarding market professionals perform initial due diligence 
and postinvestment monitoring of third-party investments, they 
should use all reasonably available resources to investigate the third 
party.127 Broker-dealers and investment advisers should review all 
relevant documents, perform additional due diligence for the 
potential investment, investigate any areas of concern, and ensure 
that the transaction meets regulatory requirements. After performing 
this high level of due diligence, financial institutions should then be 
required to disclose all material facts to their clients. Additionally, 
broker-dealers and investment advisers would have an obligation 
under agency law to perform postinvestment monitoring of the third 
parties. As agents who claim “to possess special skills or 
knowledge,”128 broker-dealers and investment advisers should use the 
full breadth of these skills to represent their clients’ interests by 
thoroughly investigating potential third-party investments. 
First, agency law would require that forwarding market 
professionals review all relevant documents concerning third-party 
investments for potential problems that might warrant further 
investigation. For instance, in Steed Finance LDC v. Nomura 
Securities International, Inc.,129 Steed hired AMRESCO Advisors, Inc. 
 
 126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act 
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”); see 
also id. § 8.08 (“Subject to any agreement with the principal, an agent has a duty to the principal 
to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar 
circumstances. Special skills or knowledge possessed by an agent are circumstances to be taken 
into account in determining whether the agent acted with due care and diligence. If an agent 
claims to possess special skills or knowledge, the agent has a duty to the principal to act with the 
care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents with such skills or knowledge.”); 
id. § 8.10 (“An agent has a duty, within the scope of the agency relationship, to act reasonably 
and to refrain from conduct that is likely to damage the principal’s enterprise.”). 
 127. See id. § 8.08 (describing the specific duties an agent owes to a principal); see also supra 
note 63 and accompanying text. 
 128. Id. § 8.08. 
 129. Steed Fin. LDC v. Nomura Sec. Int’l, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 8058(NRB), 2004 WL 2072536 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2004). 
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as its agent130 to perform due diligence on a potential investment in 
subordinate commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.131 Steed 
claimed that the defendants, the sellers of the certificates, had made 
misleading statements about the investment,132 but the defendants 
ultimately proved that they had made full disclosures to AMRESCO, 
which had failed to perform its due diligence by not adequately 
reviewing those disclosures.133 Though AMRESCO’s due-diligence 
team leader claimed that he had never seen the relevant litigation 
disclosures,134 the court found that AMRESCO had indeed received 
these documents and that, by not reviewing the documents, 
AMRESCO had failed to meet its duty of due diligence under agency 
law.135 In this case, review of the disclosures would have revealed the 
potential concerns that sophisticated market professionals should 
have noticed.136 
Next, agency law would require further due-diligence measures 
beyond mere document review. Such measures might entail 
investigating references for a potential investment and meeting with 
relevant officers of the third-party company. For instance, in In re 
Rich,137 the defendant, “an accountant and former managing partner 
of J. Manning Winikus & Co.,”138 had a fiduciary duty because of his 
agency relationship139 with his client, Ruth Wolfert.140 Wolfert had 
 
 130. See id. at *6 (specifically defining an agency relationship between AMRESCO and 
Steed). 
 131. Id. at *1. 
 132. Id. at *3. 
 133. See id. at *4 (“Defendants assert that a Litigation Disclosure revealing all relevant 
information was delivered directly to Steed and to its delegate, AMRESCO, whom Steed had 
hired to conduct due diligence in connection with the D5 Trust, and thus that all information 
which Steed claims was withheld was disclosed and, accordingly, plaintiff was not misled.”). 
 134. See id. at *5 (“Larry Hicks, the head of AMRESCO’s due diligence team, stat[ed] that 
he never saw the Litigation Disclosure (which was allegedly included in the Asset Summary 
Report) and was not aware of its contents.”). 
 135. See id. at *6 (“[C]ontrary to Mr. Hicks’ recollection, the Asset Summary Report was 
received by AMRESCO, who was acting as Steed’s agent to perform pre-purchase due 
diligence . . . .” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). 
 136. See id. at *7 (“The disclosures in the Asset Summary Report certainly contained 
sufficient ‘red flags’ that a sophisticated investor should have realized that more due diligence 
was warranted. In fact, even ordinary investors are not permitted to ignore obvious warning 
signs.”). 
 137. In re Rich, 353 B.R. 796 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 138. Id. at 799. 
 139. Id. at 805–07. 
 140. Id. at 800. 
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transferred $169,500 to the defendant for investment.141 The 
defendant invested his client’s funds in two investment schemes, 
through which he lost substantial portions of the funds.142 Despite 
claims to the contrary by the plaintiff—the executor of Wolfert’s 
estate—the court ruled that the defendant had indeed performed 
adequate due diligence.143 Critically, with the two investments, the 
defendant had ensured the existence of the U.S. Treasury bonds that 
were to be redeemed, had met with relevant officers, had performed a 
criminal background check on one of the potential third-party 
companies, had examined relevant financial statements, and had 
contacted references.144 As this case demonstrates, only extensive due 
diligence beyond initial document review would meet agency law’s 
exacting fiduciary standard. 
This heightened due-diligence standard would remedy the 
ineffective and ambiguous requirements created by the statutory 
framework of the 1934 Act and the IAA145 by imposing a more 
stringent standard whenever a financial institution does not review 
documents or obtain other readily available information that would 
have revealed areas of concern for a potential third-party investment. 
The need for such a heightened standard is exacerbated by the fact 
that any weak requirements of due diligence under the system erected 
by the 1934 Act and the IAA have largely been applied only to 
investment advisers; broker-dealers have not faced similar 
requirements.146 The adoption of an agency framework would 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 800–02. 
 143. Id. at 812. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this case 
because the defendant’s due-diligence efforts created a question of fact as to whether he had 
breached his agency relationship. Id. 
 144. See id. at 807–08 (“The Debtor claims that his due diligence consisted of: (i) confirming 
the existence of the U.S. Treasury Bonds that would allegedly be redeemed; (ii) speaking 
directly with a ‘person’ who George claimed to be an intermediary for the holders of the U.S. 
Treasury Bonds; (iii) sending a business consultant to Europe to verify parts of George’s story; 
(iv) checking police records as to George’s background; and (v) speaking to a director of a 
Dreyfus mutual fund about George generally.”); id. at 810 (describing that, for the second 
investment, “(i) [the defendant] inquired about Mintus at Citibank, where [he and the decedent] 
both had accounts, and concluded that Citibank found her reliable; (ii) he contacted the 
references provided by Mintus and was told that she was responsible and reliable; (iii) he met 
with Mintus several times and brought a business associate with him; they both allegedly felt 
that Mintus was sincere; and (iv) he examined records of Mintus’ prior investments, which 
allegedly reflected enormous profits”). 
 145. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra Part I. 
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mandate a heightened duty of due diligence both for broker-dealers 
and investment advisers operating in this context. 
Furthermore, in the event that due diligence were to reveal any 
areas of concern, agency law would require forwarding market 
professionals to review those areas of concern through in-depth 
investigation. Agency case law in the real-estate context elaborates on 
this principle.147 In Easton v. Strassburger,148 real-estate brokers acted 
as agents to inspect a house for a potential sale.149 Although the agents 
had inspected the house prior to sale and had noticed potential 
problems with the soil, they neglected to request soil tests and did not 
inform their clients of the potential complications.150 Later, soil 
erosion damaged the house, resulting in a loss of $213,000.151 When 
the California Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s fraud claim 
against the agents, it implicitly admitted that the agents had not acted 
in bad faith.152 Nevertheless, the court found them liable for 
negligence153 because they had violated their “affirmative duty to 
conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the 
residential property listed for sale.”154 
Agency law would thus expand upon the due-diligence 
requirements imposed by the 1934 Act and the IAA by establishing 
negligence as the standard for fiduciary violations.155 As applied to the 
financial-services industry, broker-dealers and investment advisers 
would be required to investigate of any possible concerns that 
reasonable market professionals would have noticed in a potential 
third-party investment. Even negligent ignorance of concerns 
 
 147. See Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391–92 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding a real-
estate broker liable for failing to investigate potential soil problems that later caused massive 
property damage). 
 148. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 149. See id. at 385–86 (“Appellant was represented in the sale of the property by its agents 
Simkin and Mourning.”). 
 150. See id. at 386 (“There is also evidence they were aware of certain ‘red flags’ which 
should have indicated to them that there were soil problems. Despite this, the agents did not 
request that the soil stability of the property be tested and did not inform respondent that there 
were potential soil problems.”). 
 151. Id. at 385. 
 152. See id. at 387 (“As noted, however, appellant’s liability was here grounded on 
negligence rather than fraud.”). 
 153. Id. at 397. 
 154. Id. at 390 (footnote omitted). 
 155. See id. at 387 (“We are concerned here only with the elements of a simple negligence 
action . . . .”). 
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warranting investigation would establish liability under agency law.156 
Under the existing regulatory system, courts have sometimes looked 
to whether financial institutions have acted in good faith;157 agency 
law would provide a more exacting standard that would hold financial 
institutions liable for negligent failure to perform due diligence 
regardless of their good faith. 
Additionally, agency law would require forwarding market 
professionals to ensure that potential transactions meet all regulatory 
requirements. AFA Private Equity Fund 1 v. Miresco Investment 
Services158 provides an analogous case to illustrate this point. In that 
case, the plaintiff had purchased 73,600 shares of Series B preferred 
stock for $1 million in Miresco, a wholesale distributor of area rugs.159 
The plaintiff utilized broker-dealer Sanders Morris Harris (SMH) as 
the placement agent for the transaction,160 and the stock purchase 
agreement explicitly stated that “SMH was to act as an agent for 
Plaintiff and other investors.”161 In that capacity, “SMH was to assure 
that all documents and instruments incident to the stock transaction 
were satisfactory in substance and form.”162 Although the court found 
that SMH had aptly performed due diligence to find irregularities in 
Miresco’s financial statements and had disclosed the results to the 
plaintiff,163 the court denied SMH’s motion to dismiss, given evidence 
that its due diligence had failed to discover that the transaction was 
potentially an unregistered sale of securities.164 As applied to financial 
institutions, this case expands conceptions of fiduciary duties by 
supporting the proposition that broker-dealers and investment 
 
 156. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. 
 158. AFA Private Equity Fund 1 v. Miresco Inv. Servs., No. 02-74650, 2005 WL 2417116 
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2005). 
 159. Id. at *1. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at *10. 
 162. Id. The agreement further stated “that SMH would conduct a due-diligence 
investigation and inform Plaintiff whether, in its good faith judgment, there were any material 
facts that would make the investment inadvisable, and that SMH would assure that the business, 
assets, financial condition, and operations of Miresco were substantially as represented to 
SMH.” Id. 
 163. See id. at *2 (“Sometime in June, 2002, SMH representatives informed Plaintiff that 
there were accounting irregularities relating to the financial position of Miresco.”). 
 164. See id. at *9 (“SMH must present evidence showing that the securities at issue here are 
exempt from registration under the rules adopted by the SEC under § 4(2).”). The court ruled 
against SMH’s motion to dismiss. Id. at *12. 
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advisers should investigate whether an investment comports with 
relevant regulations. 
After performing due diligence, broker-dealers and investment 
advisers should disclose all material facts concerning potential third-
party investments.165 An agency-law framework for disclosure of 
material facts to clients would eliminate the option of silence that 
often occurs under the framework created by the 1934 Act and the 
IAA166 and would encourage the free flow of information from 
financial institutions to their clients.167 For example, in Thomas & 
Wong, General Contractor, Inc. v. Wallace,168 the plaintiffs employed 
Wallace as an agent to negotiate their investment in BDV, a company 
that “intended to finance various business operations, including a 
mobile checkcashing business.”169 Thomas & Wong requested that 
Wallace complete a specific due-diligence list.170 Wallace failed to 
disclose material facts regarding the investment, and BDV 
subsequently defaulted on the loan.171 The court denied Wallace’s 
 
 165. See, e.g., Thomas & Wong, Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Wallace, No. 1 CA-CV 08-0634, 
2010 WL 475690, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2010) (holding an agent responsible for 
withholding material facts related to the results of due diligence in a particular transaction). 
 166. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
 167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (2006) (“An agent has a duty to use 
reasonable effort to provide the principal with facts that the agent knows, has reason to know, 
or should know when (1) subject to any manifestation by the principal, the agent knows or has 
reason to know that the principal would wish to have the facts or the facts are material to the 
agent’s duties to the principal; and (2) the facts can be provided to the principal without 
violating a superior duty owed by the agent to another person.”). 
 168. Thomas & Wong, Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Wallace, No. 1 CA-CV 08-0634, 2010 WL 
475690 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2010). 
 169. Id. at *1. 
 170. See id. at *2 (“Before funding the loan, Tarapaski wanted the due-diligence checklist 
completed; in particular, he wanted to confirm the existence of the gold doré collateral and 
ensure that both the certificate of insurance for the gold and the safekeeping receipt that 
prohibited the gold from being moved without consent had been assigned to Thomas & Wong. 
Wallace agreed to attend a gold viewing to confirm the existence of the gold on behalf of 
Thomas & Wong, and assured Tarapaski that the certificate of insurance and the safekeeping 
receipt had been assigned to Thomas & Wong.”). 
 171. See id. (“Unbeknownst to Tarapaski, six days earlier, on March 6, 2007, Wallace 
instructed Cane O’Neill to release $275,000 to a company called L Trust, for the purchase of the 
Minneapolis condominium; Wallace never disclosed this fact to Tarapaski. On March 21, 2007, 
Wallace authorized an additional $20,000 disbursement to L Trust, without Tarapaski’s 
knowledge, for reasons she could not explain. Further, despite agreeing to do so, Wallace never 
personally viewed the gold to confirm its existence.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at *3 
(“Despite repeated assurances that the primary loan would fund, it never closed and BDV 
defaulted on its obligation to Thomas & Wong.”). The court further elaborated on Wallace’s 
deficient due diligence and subsequent disclosure by explaining that 
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motion for judgment as a matter of law,172 supporting the notion that 
under agency law, agents must disclose all known material facts 
regarding potential investments as part of their duty of due diligence. 
Unlike the regulatory framework created by the 1934 Act and the 
IAA, agency law would emphasize that silence concerning material 
facts does not mitigate liability.173 
Finally, under agency principles, broker-dealers and investment 
advisers would owe their clients a continuous duty to monitor 
investments, even after the initial transaction. For instance, in SCF 
Arizona v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,174 Wachovia had explicitly become 
an agent of SCF through an investment contract.175 Wachovia had 
subsequently purchased $25 million of bonds issued by Lehman 
Brothers Holdings with its client’s funds.176 Although the housing 
bubble made this a strong investment at the time, SCF alleged that 
because the housing bubble burst in late 2007, Wachovia either 
should have withdrawn these funds as part of its duties to monitor 
continuously the investment of SCF funds or should have warned 
SCF of this new risk.177 SCF provided evidence that, even as late as 
 
[a]lthough Wallace initially told Tarapaski that the gold had been sent to Salt Lake 
City to melt for sale, and then claimed that $12 million had been realized from the 
sale, Tarapaski ultimately learned that the gold had never been melted or sold. In 
Tarapaski’s subsequent personal attempt to track and seize the gold, he found 
containers with what appeared to be gold concentrate; but tests later revealed that the 
material in the containers was worthless. 
Id. at 3. 
 172. See id. at *9 (“The record reflects sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Wallace 
breached this duty to Thomas & Wong by failing to disclose material information.”).  
 173. See id. (describing Wallace’s silence concerning material facts); see also In re Swartz, 
630 P.2d 1020, 1026 (Ariz. 1981) (en banc) (“As an agent with fiduciary duties to his co-
investors, respondent owed them the obligation of fully disclosing all material facts concerning 
the sale of the Denny Ranch.”). 
 174. SCF Ariz. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 9513(WHP), 2010 WL 5422505 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010). 
 175. See id. at *1 (“Paragraph 1 of the Agreement, titled ‘Creation of Agency Relationship,’ 
provided that SCF ‘hereby authorizes [Wachovia] to act as its Agent in arranging for loans of 
securities of [SCF] currently in the possession or control of First Interstate Bank of Arizona 
(‘Bank’) in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement.’” (alterations in 
original)). 
 176. Id. at *2. 
 177. See id. at *3 (“As the ‘housing bubble’ began to burst in late 2007, SCF alleges that it 
became ‘apparent that investment banks and other institutions which had bet heavily on the 
housing market by investing in mortgage-backed securities might sustain severe losses.’” 
(quoting First Amended Complaint at 12, SCF Ariz., No. 09 Civ. 9513(WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
14, 2010))); id. at *5 (“Rather than challenging Wachovia’s decision to invest in Lehman bonds, 
SCF claims that Wachovia breached the contract months later in failing to ‘maintain’ and 
‘protect’ the collateral by selling the Lehman bonds or advising it of the increased risk.”).  
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the summer of 2008, Wachovia could have sold the bonds without 
incurring substantial losses.178 Despite this opportunity, Wachovia had 
failed to withdraw the funds, and after Lehman filed for bankruptcy, 
the bonds lost almost their entire value.179 SCF had specifically 
invested its funds with Wachovia and had authorized Wachovia as its 
agent because of SCF’s lack of sophisticated knowledge and 
Wachovia’s purported market expertise.180 The court denied 
Wachovia’s motion to dismiss the claim for breach of fiduciary duty, 
relying on evidence that Wachovia “[had known], or should have 
known, about the increased risk of its Lehman investment beginning 
in the spring of 2008.”181 
Thus, under an agency regime, forwarding market professionals 
would face a continuous duty to use reasonable diligence in 
monitoring the postinvestment status of client funds. Forwarding 
market professionals would be required to monitor both the specific 
investment and the market surrounding the investment.182 Rather than 
premising liability only on active misstatements, and rather than 
adopting the weak monitoring standard exemplified by cases such as 
Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co,183 agency law would provide a 
concrete affirmative duty of postinvestment monitoring for financial 
institutions when they invest client funds with third parties. 
Additionally, because broker-dealers do not face a duty of 
 
 178. See id. at *3 (“While the Lehman bonds were not trading at par in the spring and 
summer of 2008, their market value was sufficiently high that Wachovia could have sold them 
without incurring substantial losses.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at *2 (“SCF alleges that because it lacked knowledge and sophistication with regard 
to securities lending transactions, it ‘relied exclusively on Wachovia’s expertise, integrity and 
professional judgment’ to administer the securities lending program and to perform its duties as 
agent ‘in the best economic interests of SCF.’” (quoting First Amended Complaint, supra note 
177, at 7)). 
 181. Id. at *9, *11. 
 182. Postinvestment due diligence would entail similar measures as due diligence in the 
initial investment context. In addition to having to monitor the specific investment, forwarding 
market professionals would also be required to maintain diligent awareness of the overall 
performance of the market for the investment. See, e.g., id. at *3 (“While SCF acknowledges 
that the Lehman investment was ‘initially a suitable one,’ it claims that the collapse of Bear 
Stearns & Co. (‘Bear Stearns’) and other ‘significant market indications’ in 2008 should have 
alerted Wachovia that the Lehman investment ‘might no longer be’ safe. According to the 
Complaint, the Bear Stearns collapse indicated that similar ‘weaknesses . . . might affect other 
banks, including Lehman,’ and that the market no longer viewed Lehman bonds as a low-risk 
investment.” (omission in original) (citations omitted) (quoting First Amended Complaint, 
supra note 177, at 13)). 
 183. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
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postinvestment monitoring under the regulatory system created by 
the 1934 Act and the IAA,184 an agency framework would 
appropriately heighten broker-dealers’ duties to their clients in the 
context of third-party investments. 
As case law demonstrates, agency law would provide well-
articulated fiduciary duties for forwarding market professionals. 
Broker-dealers and investment advisers, when acting as their clients’ 
agents, would be required to review all relevant documents 
concerning potential third-party investments. In addition to this 
preliminary requirement, they would have to perform further due 
diligence, such as meeting with relevant officers and investigating 
recommendations for potential investments. Financial institutions 
would then need to then investigate any potential concerns that a 
reasonable market professional would have noticed. Moreover, under 
an agency framework, forwarding market professionals would have to 
ensure that the transaction complies with relevant regulations. These 
financial institutions would then be required to disclose to clients 
relevant facts discovered during due-diligence investigations. Lastly, 
duties of forwarding market professionals under agency law would 
extend past an initial investment and include an affirmative duty of 
postinvestment monitoring. 
B. Examples of Breaches of Due Diligence and Postinvestment 
Monitoring Duties by Forwarding Market Professionals 
When broker-dealers and investment advisers considered placing 
client funds with Madoff, the due diligence required under an agency-
law framework would have brought to their attention numerous 
concerns about Madoff’s purported investment strategy. As early as 
1999, some financial experts, such as Harry Markopolos, began to 
suspect that Madoff was engaging in illegal activity.185 After 
performing due diligence, Markopolos concluded that Madoff’s 
operations merited serious investigation; he submitted a full report to 
the SEC in 2005.186 
 
 184. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 185. Craig M. Douglas, Madoff Had Early Skeptic in Boston Gumshoe, BOS. BUS. J. (Dec. 
16, 2008, 1:15 PM EST), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2008/12/15/daily23.html. 
 186. Justin Fox, Harry Markopolos Really Did Have the Goods on Bernie Madoff, TIME 
(Dec. 18, 2008), http://business.time.com/2008/12/18/harry-markopolos-really-did-have-the-
goods-on-bernie-madoff. 
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Many financial institutions that invested in Madoff’s scheme 
failed to meet agency law’s basic requirements of reviewing relevant 
documents to determine whether any potential concerns existed; 
others recklessly disregarded Madoff’s dubious activity.187 Before 
public discovery of Madoff’s fraud, hedge fund manager Merkin was 
suspicious of Madoff and was warned by two trusted colleagues that 
this investment was “too good to be true” and might be a Ponzi 
scheme.188 Under an agency framework, even negligent inattention to 
these concerns when reasonable due diligence would have discovered 
them would result in a breach of the duties arising from an agency 
relationship.189 At best, financial advisers such as Merkin were 
negligent in the performance of due diligence and would have faced 
liability under relevant agency law. 
Not long after the collapse of Madoff’s fund, Irving Picard, the 
court-appointed liquidating trustee of Madoff’s firm, filed suit against 
numerous forwarding brokers who had invested with Madoff for 
ignoring suspicious signs from Madoff’s operations and for failing to 
engage in postinvestment monitoring of the investments.190 One of the 
most prominent of these suits was the case against JPMorgan Chase 
& Co. (JPMorgan), who Picard alleged had gained $1 billion in fees 
for investments with Madoff despite having been “willfully blind” 
toward Madoff’s nefarious activities.191 JPMorgan “admitted in the 
months before Madoff’s arrest that . . . returns had been too good—
especially in down markets—to [have been] believable, but for years 
 
 187. See Jim Zarroli, Madoff’s Victims May Still Have More To Lose, NPR (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/13/132032517/madoff-s-victims-may-still-have-more-to-lose (“One 
theory involves the so-called forwarding brokers or investment advisers who were 
recommending to their clients that they invest their money with Madoff. Picard has alleged that 
several of them were reckless in not being aware that Madoff was engaged in a huge Ponzi 
scheme, or that they just turned a blind eye to it.” (quoting Professor James D. Cox)). 
 188. Graybow, supra note 14. 
 189. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006) (“[T]he agent has a duty to the 
principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents with such 
skills or knowledge.”). 
 190. See Amended Complaint (Redacted), Sec. Inv. Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff 
Inv. Sec. LLC, No.1:11-cv-00913 (CM) (MHD) (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2011) 2011 WL 2551979. 
 191. See Colin Barr, JPMorgan and Madoff: Tighter than You Thought?, CNN MONEY 
(Dec. 2, 2010, 2:50 PM ET), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/12/02/jpmorgan-and-madoff-
tighter-than-you-thought (“JP Morgan was willfully blind to the fraud, even after learning about 
numerous red flags surrounding Madoff. . . . While many financial institutions enabled Madoff’s 
fraud, JPMC was at the very center of that fraud, and thoroughly complicit in it.” (quoting 
David J. Sheehan, counsel for the trustee) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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they pretended that was not the case.”192 Even if JPMorgan was not 
immediately aware of Madoff’s fraudulent activity when it first 
invested in Madoff’s scheme, the subsequent—and suspiciously 
steady—returns of 10 percent to 12 percent should have prompted 
some skepticism.193 Under agency case law, JPMorgan would have 
been liable for failing to perform its duty of postinvestment 
monitoring.194 If the questionably steady profit flow had become a 
concern after initial investment, JPMorgan would have been required 
to investigate this issue further as part of its postinvestment 
monitoring duties under agency law. 
Madoff constructed a fraudulent scheme rife with warning 
signals, many of which reasonable financial institutions should have 
noticed. The due diligence requirement under an agency framework 
would have compelled these financial institutions to discover the 
suspicious nature of Madoff’s investment plan. Although the 
consistent 10 percent to 12 percent returns on investments that 
Madoff offered were “within the realm of possibility, if just barely,”195 
financial institutions that performed adequate due diligence would 
likely have realized that, in the words of one journalist, “consistency 
at the highest level isn’t bad; it’s impossible.”196 Ultimately, “nothing 
in which you are putting millions of dollars is so wonderful that it 
cannot withstand scrutiny.”197 Agency law’s exacting framework 
would protect clients from schemes such as Madoff’s by providing 
clearly defined duties of due diligence and postinvestment monitoring 
for forwarding market professionals. 
 
 192. Scott Shifrel, Madoff Trustee Sues Bank for Being ‘Blind,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 3, 
2010, at 24 (omission in original) (quoting Deborah Renner, counsel for Irving Picard) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 193. See Paul Sullivan, The Rules That Madoff’s Investors Ignored, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/your-money/06wealth.html (“Mr. Madoff’s returns 
were too good to be true, but no one wanted to believe that.”). 
 194. See, e.g., SCF Ariz. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 9513(WHP), 2010 WL 
5422505, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010) (describing the duty of postinvestment monitoring 
under agency law). 
 195. Sullivan, supra note 193. 
 196. Id. Sullivan further elaborates that “[i]t defies logic that someone so well versed in a 
market with as many unforeseeable glitches as baseball would believe that an equally imperfect 
world—investing—could be so steady.” Id. 
 197. Id. 
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C. Implementation Under the Dodd-Frank Act 
Agency law would provide a strong framework for defining the 
fiduciary duties that forwarding market professionals owe their 
clients. Although a heightened regulatory structure might initially 
increase transaction costs in the financial-services industry as 
forwarding market professionals adapt to the new system,198 it also 
would offer the best remedy for many of the problems highlighted by 
the economic crisis of 2008 and its fallout.199 Although fiduciary duties 
arising from agency law exist independent of statutory requirements, 
the Dodd-Frank Act presents an apt opportunity to implement 
agency principles in statutory form.200 An agency framework would 
replace the antiquated distinction between broker-dealers and 
investment advisers and would establish a fiduciary duty for 
forwarding market professionals when both the forwarding market 
professional and its clients manifest assent for the financial institution 
to act on the client’s behalf with regard to third-party investments. 
The specific contours of this fiduciary duty would reflect agency case 
law in analogous commercial contexts.201 
Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act expressly authorizes the SEC to 
establish a clearly defined fiduciary duty for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers after a six-month study period.202 Congress did 
 
 198. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 275 (2010) (“But 
when new forms are chosen because they reduce regulatory costs and increase transaction costs 
compared to the old structure, we lose twice: efficiency is reduced by the increase in transaction 
costs, and the regulatory burden is shifted onto those who cannot engage in arbitrage. Worse 
yet, if everyone engages in the arbitrage, all we have done is increased transaction costs with no 
net change in the incidence of the regulatory burden.”). 
 199. See supra Part II.B. 
 200. A statutory fiduciary duty, based on principles of agency law, for financial institutions 
regarding funds handled by third parties would comport with the specific requirements of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. For instance, Congress in that legislation has explicitly authorized the SEC to 
establish a “best interest” standard for investment advice that broker-dealers and investment 
advisers provide to clients. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L No. 111-203, § 913(g)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1829 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k) (Supp. IV 
2010)). Although broker-dealers face a low “suitability” standard, the Dodd-Frank Act includes 
statutory provisions that are meant to harmonize regulations of broker-dealers and investment 
advisers, id., so the SEC could provide that broker-dealers have a continuing fiduciary duty of 
postinvestment monitoring if both the broker-dealer and his client manifest assent to such a 
relationship. 
 201. See supra Part III.A. As the cases cited in that Section indicate, a statutory framework 
based on agency law would create a private cause of action. 
 202. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g), 124 Stat. 
at 1828–29 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(k)–(l), 80b-11(g)–(h)) (amending the 1934 Act and the 
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not require the SEC to provide a new statutory fiduciary duty for 
financial institutions, but the SEC will likely use this opportunity in 
some form.203 In January 2011, the SEC released a study,204 as required 
by section 913(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.205 Although the SEC study 
does not explicitly recommend a fiduciary duty based on agency law, 
the SEC’s study highlights the need for a “uniform fiduciary 
standard” applicable to both broker-dealers and investment 
advisers.206 In the study, the SEC specifically “recommends the 
consideration of rulemakings that would apply expressly and 
uniformly to both broker-dealers and investment advisers.”207 This 
fiduciary standard would be “no less stringent than [the standard] 
currently applied to investment advisers under Advisers Act Sections 
206(1) and (2).”208 Applying agency-law standards to the forwarding 
activities of broker-dealers and investment advisers would satisfy 
these wishes. 
At the beginning of 2012, the SEC had not yet implemented a 
heightened fiduciary duty for forwarding market professionals 
pursuant to the results of the January 2011 study. Still, many experts 
have called for the SEC to use this provision of the Dodd-Frank Act 
to establish a new regulatory framework for defining fiduciary duties 
in the financial-services industry.209 Significantly, Congressman 
Barney Frank, coauthor of the Dodd-Frank Act, sent a letter to the 
SEC requesting that it establish a new fiduciary framework for the 
financial-services industry independent of the regulatory system 
 
IAA to allow the SEC to provide new fiduciary duties for broker-dealers and investment 
advisers). 
 203. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, THE DODD-FRANK 
ACT: COMMENTARY AND INSIGHTS 82 (2010), available at http://www.skadden.com/Cimages/
siteFile/Skadden_Insights_Special_Edition_Dodd-Frank_Act1.pdf. 
 204. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS: AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913
studyfinal.pdf. 
 205. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(b), 124 Stat. at 
1824–25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o note). 
 206. Id. at vi. 
 207. Id. at v. 
 208. Id. at v–vi. 
 209. For example, “[a] petition signed by about 5,200 financial planners [was] delivered to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, urging it to impose a universal fiduciary duty on 
anyone providing retail investment advice.” Mark Schoeff, Jr., Insurers Want Fiduciary Duty 
Killed: Planners, INV. NEWS (June 26, 2011, 6:01 AM ET), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20110626/REG/306269971. 
ISAKOFF IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2012  11:48 PM 
2012] AGENTS OF CHANGE 1597 
created by the 1934 Act and the IAA.210 Critics of the January 2011 
study noted that it did not provide a clear framework for establishing 
a heightened fiduciary duty, and they argued that “[a] stronger 
analytical and empirical foundation than provided by the Study 
[should be] required before regulatory steps are taken that would 
revamp how broker-dealers and investment advisers are regulated.”211 
As this Note demonstrates, agency law would provide such a 
framework, informed by decades of case law. The agency-law 
framework more clearly defines the fiduciary duties broker-dealers 
and investment advisers owe their clients when they invest funds with 
third parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The aftermath of the Madoff investment scandal highlighted the 
need for regulatory reform in the financial-services industry. 
Forwarding market professionals such as FGG and Merkin ignored 
obvious warning signs about Madoff’s suspicious behavior and failed 
to perform adequate due diligence before investing client funds with 
Madoff.212 Independent of regulations under the 1934 Act and the 
IAA, specific duties arise under agency law that would have 
protected the clients of these financial institutions. 
Regulations of forwarding market professionals based on the 
1934 Act and the IAA do not provide sufficient safeguards for clients. 
Under these regulations, broker-dealers face a mere suitability 
standard as long as the investment advice provided is “solely 
incidental” to brokerage services.213 Even when fiduciary duties do 
arise for financial institutions, in practice, these obligations often 
 
 210. Letter from Rep. Barney Frank, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., to Mary 
L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 30, 2011), available at http://media.advisor
one.com/advisorone/files/ckeditor/Barney%20Frank%20Letter.pdf (“If Congress intended the 
SEC to simply copy the ‘40 Act and apply it to broker-dealers, it would have simply repealed 
the broker-dealer exemption—an approach Congress considered but rejected. The new 
standard contemplated by Congress is intended to recognize and appropriately adapt to the 
differences between broker-dealers and registered investment advisors.”). 
 211. Statement, Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Comm’rs, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Statement Regarding Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012211klctap.htm. 
 212. See Graybow, supra note 14 (“The lawsuit against Merkin contends that at least two of 
his trusted colleagues repeatedly told him Madoff’s returns were too good to be true—one 
warning that Madoff’s money management business could be a Ponzi scheme, Cuomo said.”). 
 213. See supra Part I.B. 
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promote silence rather than disclosure.214 Only material misstatements 
are treated as clear violations of fiduciary duties, and withholding 
negative information violates fiduciary obligations only after a 
broker-dealer or investment adviser has already provided some 
positive information on a potential investment with a third party.215 
Agency law would help establish a much-needed framework for 
reform in the financial-services industry. Broker-dealers and 
investment advisers often form an agency relationship with their 
clients based on the mutual assent of both parties. Moreover, agency 
case law provides a detailed analysis of specific fiduciary duties that 
forwarding market professionals would owe their clients when they 
invest funds with third parties. For instance, these financial 
institutions would be required to review all relevant documents 
concerning a potential third-party investment and also to perform 
more extensive due-diligence procedures, such as meeting with 
officers of the third party and performing a detailed background 
check of the potential investment. Additionally, broker-dealers and 
investment advisers would be required to investigate any causes for 
concern that arise from a potential third-party investment and to 
disclose these results to their clients. Lastly, under an agency-law 
framework, forwarding market professionals would have a continued 
duty of due diligence and postinvestment monitoring. 
The Dodd-Frank Act presents an ideal opportunity to establish a 
statutory fiduciary duty for forwarding market professionals based on 
principles of agency law. Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act specifically 
authorizes the SEC to define a new heightened fiduciary duty for 
broker-dealers and investment advisers. Although the SEC has not 
yet taken advantage of this opportunity, both industry experts and 
politicians have called for a new framework of fiduciary duties 
independent of the statutory requirements created by the 1934 Act 
and the IAA. Agency law would provide this framework by clearly 
outlining the specific duties forwarding market professionals owe 
their clients for third-party investments. 
 
 214. See supra Part I.C. 
 215. E.g., Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 4699, 33 S.E.C. 311, 321 
(Apr. 8, 1952). 
